Satanic Panic and the Political Fear of Uncanny Queerness

Uncanny [uhn-kan-ee]

  1.  having or seeming to have a supernatural or inexplicable basis; beyond the ordinary or normal; extraordinary: uncanny accuracy; an uncanny knack of foreseeing trouble.
  2. mysterious; arousing superstitious fear or dread; uncomfortably strange: Uncanny sounds filled the house.

As I mentioned in the previous entry, queer theorist Lee Edelman argues that politics is typically understood through the symbolism of “reproductive futurism” in which the Child (and, as he points out, he is referring to the figure of the Child as a projection of a better, unified future and, by implication, a failed past in need of redemption) is the signifier by which the political discourses of both the Left and Right revolve; an “insistence on sameness that intends to restore an Imaginary past.”[1]

Edelman argues that queerness should choose no side in this bogus dialectic of political hope for saving the figurative Child. According to Edelman,

Truth, like queerness, irreducibly linked to the “aberrant or atypical,” to what chafes against “normalization,” finds its value not in a good susceptible to generalization, but only in the stubborn particularity that voids every notion of a general good. The embrace of queer negativity, then, can have no justification if justification requires it to reinforce some positive social value; its value, instead, resides in its challenge to value as defined by the social, and thus in its radical challenge to the very value of the social itself… [T]he queer dispossess the social order of the ground on which it rests: a faith in the consistent reality of the social – and by extension, of the social subject; a faith that politics, whether of the left or of the right, implicitly affirms.[2]

Queer negativity then might be considered, in a sense, as what Alain Badiou calls “supernumerary” to a set, what is beyond counting. What Edelman and Badiou are describing is that which cannot be named precisely because it cannot be (re)cognized – at least not fully – by a world structured according to a particular (Christian) understanding of history, society, philosophy, and politics. This unnamable negativity or what is uncountable is simply uncanny to the Christian world. It does not necessarily precede the languages and discourses of that world, despite the fact that it takes its grounding as a lack of ground, as a negative space or check on that world. It is counted in that world but only as a void.

The so-called “Satanic Panic” of the 1980s and 1990s was an all-too-real, all-too-human collapse of rational discourse in which the uncanny specter of satanism dominated the Christian Imaginary. Indeed, political Left and Right both paid not only lip service to purging the world of sadistic satanic violence but actively sought to convince the world that figurative and literal demons were not only in plain sight – like Tipper Gore and the PMRC’s absurd attack on obscenity with its ridiculous list of “objectionable” musical performers that glorified violence, sex and the occult[3] or James Dobson’s unintelligible crusade against satanic back-masking in ZZ Top and Aerosmith songs – but also hiding amongst us, most notably in daycare centers across the country, performing Satanic Ritual Abuse (SRA).

Even in the 1990s, right here in blasphemous San Francisco, warfare was being waged for the hearts and souls of God-fearing humans of all political stripes. Crackpots like Eric Pryor, who was eventually clobbered by a truck, pranced around enlightening believers in the supernatural that the bogeyman was lurking around every corner. Watch Pryor and his mullet mope around former favorite gay cruising and dog-walking locale, Buena Vista Park, in this 1994 video while pointing out all of the evidence of satanic rites, including a bloody noose and a bunch of spray painted inverted crosses, a video aimed at law enforcement officers so that they could recognize the signs of satanic deviants which, as Pryor is quick to point out, also means sexual deviants (aka homosexuals). In the video he explicitly states,

There are two different communities that use this park. One is the pagan or occultic community. And the other community is, of course, the homosexual community. Interestingly enough, they go hand-in-hand.

If this dude was looking for satan in San Francisco, where was he in 1985?

The bogeyman of the uncanny, of the unnamable, dominates the Imaginary of the paranoid mind of Western man. Queer negativity haunts the political landscape, structured as it is around the figure of the Child and its sanctity and purity, because it not only stands in for this satanic specter but embraces its place in the spectral void of non-representation. Its speculative moveability within the architecture and language of the political Left and Right gives its barbarism an uncanniness that ironically displaces the repetitious logic of that architecture and language. As we move on with this line of argument, again, it is worthwhile to consider the political importance, for both the political Left and Right, of its fundamentally Christian endeavor to protect the figurative Child and, in a very real sense, literal children.

[1] Lee Edelman, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive, 21.
[2] Lee Edelman, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive, 6.


No Future


I am currently re-reading Lee Edelman’s excellent book, No Future: Queer Theory & the Death Drive (highly recommended), which will prompt a re-read of the Left’s (secularized Christian) obsession with deliverance and redemption (and what Edelman calls “reproductive futurism”) aka “the Future”. I’m taking Edelman’s assertion that “politics is always a politics of the signifier” and that the “underlying structure of the political” is the futurity of the Child as the basis for this inquiry. According to Edelmen,

politics, construed as oppositional or not, never rests on essential identities. It centers, instead, on the figurality that is always essential to identity, and thus on the figural relations in which social identities are always inscribed.

With this in mind, the

queer must insist on disturbing, on queering, social organizations as such – on disturbing, therefore, and on queering ourselves and our investment in such organization. For queerness can never define an identity; it can only ever disturb one.

So, the nature of my inquiry is to read the Left’s preoccupation with the “future”, with the Christ Child as redeemer as the signifier for the future and its redemption even if it denies such a blatantly heteronormative and/or theological understanding of history and, therefore, of politics, in the background.



Levi R. Bryant over at Larval Subjects made an interesting post a few days ago re: Freudian psychoanalysis, identity and its grounding in narcissism and antagonism. Bryant makes an interesting point that is relevant to our own project:

The more we strive to coincide with the frozen image that is the ego, the more antagonistic our relations with others become. From the ego, from identification and captivation in this unhealthy form of love (there is another type of love that is not lethal or narcissistic) we encounter nothing but strife, conflict, antagonism, and war. The more we try to coincide with the captivating image and gaze, the more we need an enemy with whom to engage in with war. Nationalism must thus always go to war with other nations, identity must always vilify other identities, identification with a favorite philosopher must always lead to war with other philosophers over territories, and all the rest. The political question would thus, in part, be of how to envision a politics beyond identification, the ego, and narcissism?

Larval Subjects .

A brief post before dinner for thoughts that need to be developed in greater detail.  In an interview somewhere or other I vaguely remember that Derrida says that his project, from beginning to end, is an interrogation and deconstruction of narcissism.  Given Derrida’s profound critique of the logic of identity, this comes as no surprise, for while identity is a postulate at the heart of Western philosophy (consider Parmenides or even Plato’s divided line) that functions as a logical axiom of truth and being (A = A), it also goes to the heart of our being as egos.  In this connection, we could say that the thinkers of that beautiful French moment (Derrida, Deleuze, Irigaray, Foucault, and perhaps Lyotard), the thinkers of difference, are each in their own way addressing the problem of narcissism and its political effects.  Here I cannot help but think of Lacan and his analysis of…

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The Call & the Wall

One of the things to bear in mind with regards to a performative (poststructuralist) type of speculative intervention into what we refer to as the “subject”  is that the typical laymen’s understanding of the “subject” presupposes two crucial philosophical assumptions that we are endeavoring to, first, grasp and, secondly, to undermine: first, there is the notion that knowledges and perceptions are bordered and that there are rules or laws that govern these; secondly, that there is a call, that someone or something – typically something that is in a position of dominance, like the police or the state – brings something else into existence by “calling” it.

This is a theological notion that invades philosophy and frames with way we think philosophically and, unfortunately, therefore the way we think of politics. Someone is called by God (or gods) to do or be something beyond their profane material existence. A clumsy liberal conception of “identity politics” cannot even begin to think of subjectivity in this way. It takes identity as an essential item (not an existential) because identity presupposes two sides of the same coin: things cannot be “identical” if there is not something else that is either reliant on it or is leading it around by the nose. Identity is literally a codependency. Ironically, perhaps, for many breaking free of this codependency (or as Quentin Meillassoux calls it in After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, Kantian correlationism) would mean a deeper entrenchment, a deeper investment in one’s identity.

But are we only ever called? Alain Badiou suggests otherwise in his theory of the subject. According to him, what he calls the subject happens after the event, after an event has already taken place (or taken a place), that retroactively an event’s happening has been declared and fidelity to that event’s occurrence has also been declared and maintained. This is where the “subject” arises: in the course of making a decision to maintain fidelity to an event’s occurrence.

As we saw in the last entry on Badiou’s “Eight Theses on the Universal”, if the subject constitutes (or is constituted by) a type of hole in knowledge according to Badiou, then the subject is also a type of interpellation in the Althusserian sense. For Althusser, the interpellated subject – the subject that is conjured into existence, like a magic trick, precisely because it has been hailed – is an ideological construction. And, as we will consider in a future entry, ideology functions as a weak universalizing and ahistorical narrative that covers the gaps of one’s knowledge of something (namely, its material – and hence, political – existence).

Judith Butler also suggests otherwise. For her, identity markers like gender are performative and, therefore, not simply essential. All of these “phantasmatic constructions” function within a repetitive performance of the boundaries or rules that attempt to erect the walls of identities. As Butler notes in the concluding chapter, “From Parody to Politics”, in Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, “there need not be a ‘doer behind the deed,’ but that the ‘doer’ is variably constructed in and through the deed.”[1] Butler’s conclusion gives us something to consider as we move forward. She notes that

The deconstruction of identity is not the deconstruction of politics; rather, it establishes as political the very terms through which identity is articulated. This kind of critique brings into question the foundationalist frame in which feminism as an identity politics has been articulated. The internal paradox of this foundationalism is that it presumes, fixes, and constrains the very ‘subjects’ that it hopes to represent and liberate. The task here is not to celebrate each and every new possibility qua possibility, but to redescribe those possibilities that already exist, but which exist within cultural domains designated as culturally unintelligible and impossible. If identities were no longer fixed as the premises of a political syllogism, and politics no longer understood as a set of practices derived from the alleged interests that belong to a set of ready-made subjects, a new configuration of politics would surely emerge from the ruins of the old. Cultural configurations of sex and gender might then proliferate or, rather, their present proliferation might then become articulable within the discourses that establish intelligible cultural life, confounding the very binarism of sex, and exposing its fundamental unnaturalness. What other local strategies for engaging the ‘unnatural’ might lead to the denaturalization of gender as such?[2]

In the next entry, we will look at Butler’s conclusion as a grounding for where we are headed with regards to thinking about Walter Benjamin’s theory of a “new kind of barbarism”. The neo-Kantian speculative barbarism of Benjamin’s early writing needs to be situated, as a political concept, within this framework of identity, correlation, performance, borders and boundaries (of knowledge but also, as I will suggest, of actual physical borders and boundaries that constitute both states and private property), and, crucially, also with the theological and messianic notion of the calling in mind.

[1] Butler, Judith, Gender Trouble, 181

[2] Butler, Judith, Gender Trouble, 190.

Preliminary Notes on Badiou’s “Eight Theses on the Universal”

Thesis One: Thought is the Proper Medium of the Universal (thought & knowledge)

  • The universal can only be thought as something that does not (yet) exist in knowledge. It is, in a sense, a “hole” in knowledge.
  • This means that the universal can only ever be grasped from the position of a militant looking for this “hole”, looking for where there are cracks or gaps.
  • The subject is the effect of the process of thinking the universal, or finding cracks, gaps or holes in existing knowledge (i.e., in existing political practices). The subject does not exist prior to this endeavor (which is where Kant’s transcendental idealism is coming from).
  • [Isn’t this a version of Althusser’s “interpellation” in which the subject is created by being called into being except that with Badiou’s subject this is not imposed from an external source (as it is with Althusser) but is an internal phenomenon that extends outward – hence, it recognizes itself as a new type of subject that does not currently exist in universal knowledge?]
  • Badiou says: “Thus the central dialectic at work in the universal is that of the local, as subject, and the global, as infinite procedure. This dialectic is constitutive of thought as such.” The subject is created or brought into being by a “subjective” recognition that there is a “hole” or gap in knowledge about it and it constitutes itself in relation to this “lack” as the possibility of the universal’s existence (someday but not yet).
  • When Badiou uses the example of the assertion by “illegal immigrant workers” of France to be included and recognized, he is saying that these workers are constituted locally as subjects (something like “illegal immigrant workers that want to be recognized as contributing citizens”) and represent a challenge to the idea of universality because they are not simply local subjects (something like “What can happen there could happen here” in both its good and bad sense – think of how the idea of the French Revolution inspired the Haitians, etc.)
  • The universal is “always an incalculable emergence”. Truth cannot be known ahead of time. It is always “out of sync”, so to speak, with existing knowledge.
  • “Particular” is, according to Badiou, what can be discerned in knowledge “by means of descriptive predicates”. “Singular” is, by contrast, something that is identifiable – it exists – but there literally are no words to describe it. An ethnic population is particular but singular is that which cuts across these particularities and registers as universal.

 Thesis Two: Every Universal is Singular, or is a Singularity

  • Badiou sets himself against those who see universality as being the domain of recognizing and respecting particularities (i.e., predicates, identities). This, he says, cannot be so because it will always run up against its limit or contradict itself.
  • “…every universal presents itself not as a regularization of the particular or differences, but as a singularity that is subtracted from identitarian predicates; although obviously it proceeds via those predicates.” What this means is that the universal manifests itself as a singularity that refuses identitarian predicates for itself but uses them as tools for transmission. (At this point, this is all beginning to sound a little Laruellean to me). The singularity is a subtraction from known identitarian predicates, which foreclose or circumscribe thought. The universal singularity reserves itself as a negative check.

Thesis Three: Every Universal Originates in an Event, and the Event is Intransitive to the Particularity of the Situation

  • For Badiou, “political universalism” takes the form of an idea of universality and the fidelity (or infidelity) to that idea. What Badiou calls “reaction” is the attempt to reduce that idea to simple terms (“The French Revolution was a failure”, etc.). Essentially, “reaction” is the attempt to label an idea with predicates, to make it into a predicative particularity (aka, identity). Badiou uses sexualized differences between men and women as an example.
  • Relating back to what I wrote about being anti-social in Error Messages #1, Badiou rights that “it is perfectly clear that the attraction exerted by the universal lies precisely in the fact that it subtracts itself (or tries to subtract itself) as an asocial singularity from the predicates of knowledge.”
  • For Badiou, one of the conditions of the singularity is that there is “no available predicate capable of subjecting it to knowledge.”

Thesis Four: A Universal Initially Presents Itself as a Decision About an Undecidable

  • Encyclopedia: “I call “encyclopedia” the general system of predicative knowledge internal to a situation: i.e., what everyone knows about politics, sexual difference, culture, art, technology, etc.” Baidou claims that there are things that are not tied to this encyclopedic archive of knowledge; They “exist at the margins of the encyclopedia.”
  • Event / evental statement: “…an event is what decides about a zone of encyclopedic indiscernibility.” This is literally a “bringing attention to…” something but then it disappears because it has been declared to be a part of the situation and recognized (but perhaps not accepted) as such. (i.e., the “evental statement”; “It is something that had no valence but now does.”). The evental statement inaugurates the universal singularity. In Badiou’s word, “it fixes the present” form of thought.
  • “…every evental statement has a declarative structure…”
  • “The constituted subject follows in the wake of this declaration, which opens up a possible space for the universal.” You declare that something is missing and it is this and the subject of that statement comes in its wake. The subject is an effect of this declaration.

Thesis Five: The Universal Has an Implicative Structure

  • What Badiou seems to be saying here is that once an evental statement has been made about a situation, not all parties involved must accept the terms of that statement, as such, but they will – indeed, they must – admit that things have changed in some way… the situation has been altered. It is implied that the situation has been altered (?)

Thesis Six: The Universal is Univocal

  • The evental statement, in its declarative capacity, possesses some sense of “valence”, it makes something that wasn’t decidable or visible suddenly so. It “now possesses an exceptional valence,” Baidou says.
  • The evental statement has more to do with the act, Badiou says, rather than being or meaningful. It is the act of bringing a focal point to a decision from out of the flowing sea of many possible decisions that might’ve been able to be made. “It just so happened that the statement was decided, and this decision remains subtracted from all interpretation. It relates to the yes or the no, not to the equivocal plurality of meaning.” It is decisive – one might even say fanatically committed or authoritarian – not wishy-washy and democratic (if we read ‘democracy’ as being equivalent to deliberation and plurality). It is not an existential (being; phenomenology) or a meaning (semiotics).
  • Badiou calls this a “logical revolt”, insofar as it “must gradually begin to transform the logic of the situation in it entirety.” That is, over time (generations perhaps? Centuries?) it will begin to alter one’s subjective understanding of logic and, eventually, the collective logic (“universal” logic). Badiou says that the circumstances of a sitauation might not change but that the “logic of its appearance” might undergo a “profound transformation”.
  • Badiou sets his thesis of univocity against the thesis of equivocity. In the latter, the viewpoint is one in which universality is conceived as generalities have power over particularities. Badiou’s orientation here is the opposite; his is more militant, more fanatical: it arises from the particularity but only as a subtraction from particularities or particular predicates. This subtractive declaration alters the logic of the situation in a singular way.

Thesis Seven: Every Universal Singularity Remains Incomplete or Open

  • Here Badiou simply argues that his theses regarding a “universal singularity” or fanatical decision is in opposition to philosophies of finitude or relativism (which he says are complicit in establishing a particular point of view, one of closure and inclusion that seals itself off after it declares itself.
  • For Badiou, every universal truth must remain open or inifinite and, therefore, not declared or declarable? From this point of view, the universal truth of an evental statement dies the moment that it is uttered, correct? Or must it be uttered but declare that it can never be satisfied? If that is the case, then one’s opposition might simply be able to say, “Well, fine, but if you are telling us that we cannot meet your demands because you don’t have any demands that we can answer then what is the point? This is precisely what happened with Occupy Wall Street.

Thesis Eight: Universality is Nothing Other Than the Faithful Construction of an Infinite Generic Multiplicity

  • What Badiou calls “generic multiplicity” is that which belongs to a situation (again, it is often difficult to conceive of something that belongs but also doesn’t belong) but that is “not determined by any of the predicates of encyclopdic knowledge”. It is not determined as an identity and not determined by particular predicates.
  • The universal “leaves behind it a simple detached statement” (which takes the form of the idea of the universal?) “as a trace of the disappearance of the event that founds it.” The subject (or, rather, “subject-thought”) is an effect of this procedure à this is very different that how most people believe an agent already exists and puts things out into and adds to a pre-existing circumstance. Badiou’s theses basically say that this “agent” doesn’t exist before the declarative statement of its existence. It can declare itself as existing only in the form of saying that it “exists” in a hole or gap in the pre-existing (i.e., it doesn’t exist from the point of view of the whole), only as a negative (again, from the point of view of the whole or the State, etc).

In Defense of Speculative Leftism: Benjamin’s Porous Subject

The current essay aims to draw Benjamin’s early speculative philosophy of experience into a conversation with a trajectory within present-day continental philosophy that the editors of the anthology, The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism, refer to as “the speculative turn.” As the editors note, much of the research of the speculative turn does not absolutely reject the advances of critical philosophy so much as acknowledge and confront “their inherent limitations.” Ground zero for this confrontation is Kant’s critical philosophy. For Kant, experience is “structured by a priori categories and forms of intuition that comprise the necessary and universal basis for all knowledge. Yet the price to be paid for securing this basis is the renunciation of any knowledge beyond how things appear to us.”[1]

A political theory based on a speculative intervention into Kantian experience confronts us with difficulties, particularly from the position of a political left confronted over the last 40 years with emerging forms of political ideologies and political institutions that have been reconfigured to mirror so-called market logic. A theory of speculative politics must be able to meet the difficult challenges posed by the contemporary neoliberal political-market landscape, dominated as it seems to be by the ideology of neoliberalism,[2] the political economy of speculative finance and what Élie Ayache refers to as the  “absolute contingency” and “place process” of the market.[3] Frank Ruda notes that Quentin Meillassoux’s alleged post-Kantian non-correlative speculative realist philosophy finds its political-economic counterpart in Ayache’s ontological contingency of speculative marketization.[4] Politics as Kantian representation is distorted and challenged, if not resoundingly rejected, by the specter of a totalized market contingency. This is not simply a right-wing promotion or adherence to old-fashioned market values as it is an untethering of values and a speculative radicalization of financial market ideology that appears to race ahead of even capitalism’s abilitity to be cognized in any meaningful way.

There is a danger, if not a tendency, for many on the radical political left to fall into what Alain Badiou refers to as “speculative leftism,” which is “any thought of being which bases itself upon the theme of an absolute commencement.”[5] Speculative leftism’s insistence on “absolute novelty” is, for Badiou, politically and philosophically naïve precisely because it “fails to recognize that the real of the conditions of possibility of intervention is always the circulation of an already decided event.”[6] The speculative left imagines that it can exempt itself from representation or somehow step outside of the entrenched problems of politics as a form of representation. It envisions politics as an immediate experience. Bruno Bosteels notes that it “ignores the fact that every force is necessarily determined by a system of assigned places in which it finds its space.” This type of radical leftism “involves a reified external opposition, one as radical as it is politically inoperative,” Bosteels argues.[7] For Badiou, this always amounts to little more than “subversive arm-pumping.”[8]

Continental philosophy and critical political theory’s dogged refusal to acknowledge its limitations, if not its impotence, in the face of these challenges has caused them to lag behind real world changes in how politics is understood and practiced. If we accept Badiou’s critique of speculative leftism, which he associates most polemically with Deleuzean philosophy and its intellectual heirs, then considering a political theory of speculative experience that avoids the problems of absolute commencement and absolute contingency is a challenging endeavor, indeed.

I argue that the central concept of porosity in Walter Benjamin and Asja Lacis’ brief co-authored essay, “Naples”, gives us a way to not only think of how to distort or transform the finitude of Kantian experience but also gives us a concept by which to consider a delimited experience of speculative immanence as a political theory that is neither wholly contingent nor necessary but keeps transcendence and immanence bound together. (The interventionist project that I pursue in this blog is to flesh out this line of thinking).

It is Benjamin’s speculative intervention into the “Kantian prohibition” on the uncognized or non-cognizable that gives the concept of porosity force in Benjamin’s political theory. Crucial for imagining the way in which Benjamin’s intervention into the forms of Kantian intuition functions is to consider how there are spaces and times of varying intensities or cessations of intensities that appear and disappear in a sort of discontinuous continuity.[9] Benjamin’s speculative wager is that the contingency and fluctuation of the spatio-temporal forms of Kantian intuition fundamentally distort and transform the other two components of Kant’s schema for experience, the categories of understanding and the forms of reason. This cascading distortion of immediate experience does not obliterate the objective knowledge of experience but it delimits it, brings more possible experiences under the umbrella of knowledge. What this means for politics is if politics and The Political are inclined towards the hardening of boundaries into borders by way of decision, Benjamin’s Kantian intervention soften borders into porous and flexible boundaries. It uses the finitude of political borders as material for softening those same borders but in a way that does not obliterate their necessity, however contigent they might be made to be.

Benjamin’s early speculative philosophy anticipates Quentin Meillassoux’s argument that post-Kant philosophy is fundamentally a correlationist philosophy. However, unlike Meillassoux, who sees this correlationism as a foreclosure of philosophy, Benjamin does not believe that Kantian correlationism leads us to (philosophical or political) oblivion. Benjamin shows us a way to radicalize Kant’s correlationist conceptualization of experience by delimiting Kant’s spatio-temporal forms of intuition. He then uses this distorted correlationism of the experiencing phenomenal subject as political material.

In Kant’s hierarchy of reason, practical reason is primary; reason remains speculative if it does not have a grounding in practice. What Kant argues is that it is only that which is practical, that which is related to a practical interest, that can be necessarily cognized. Everything else is not within the view of (practical) reason proper. It is akin to madness or dreaming. Kantian practical reason is The Political in the sense that the city, state, etc. are, by definition, bordered. Politics, understood here as relating to the polis, to what lies within (and outside) the city, is an inherently bounded concept. It is a spatial concept. There is a decisionist aspect to politics in the Kantian sense insofar as The Political can only be cognized within finite boundaries. Yet with the alleged openness of the market, the Kantian necessity of practical reason would seem to dissolve against the onslaught of speculative, contingent “rationality.”

[1] Speculative Materialism, 3.

[2] According to Wendy Brown, neoliberalism is a political rationality that is “liberalism’s economic variant,” not an ideology. Wendy Brown, “Neo-liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy,” Theory and Event 7:1 (2003).

[3] Ayache, “The Medium of Contingency”, 18.

[4] Ruda, “The Speculative Family,” 72-76.

[5] Badiou, Being and Event, 210. Emphasis is mine.

[6] Badiou, Being and Event, 210.

[7] Bruno Bosteels, “The Speculative Left,” 762.

[8] Badiou, “The Flux and the Party: In the Margins of Anti-Oedipus,” 79.

[9] Both Howard Caygill and Alain Badiou use this phrase but in completely different contexts.